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I Comments
Comparing Constitutional Constraints on
Government Searches: The United States
and Hong Kong
Joseph N. Cotilletta*
I. INTRODUCTION: WHY A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS?
Since its inception in the late eighteenth century, the United States
has been a leader among democratic societies across the world.' Despite
many ups and downs economically and politically, the United States has
always maintained a reasoned and balanced legal system.2 The strength
* J.D. Candidate 2011, The Dickinson School of Law of the Pennsylvania State
University. I would like to thank my friends and family for all of their support. In
particular, I would like to thank Comments Editors Matt Charles, Matt Kita, and Sylvia
Marakas for their comments and edits to this comment as well as the Editor-in-Chief,
Benjamin Hackman. Most importantly, I would like to thank my mother for giving me
the strength to overcome all of life's obstacles and for instilling a vision in me to help
make the world a better place.
1. See Dale W. Jorgenson & Kevin J. Stiroh, Raising the Speed Limit: U.S.
Economic Growth in the Information Age, 1 BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECON. ACTIVITY
126, 128 (2000).
2. See Richard A. Primus, When Should Original Meanings Matter? 107 MICH. L.
REV. 165, 200 (2008); Melanie D. Wilson, The Return of Reasonableness: Saving the
Fourth Amendment from the Supreme Court, 59 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1, 38-39 (2008).
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and vitality of this legal system are based on many features. One feature
is that United States citizens are afforded rights against unwarranted
government intrusions.4 In particular, the rights protecting citizens from
government searches lie within the Fourth Amendment of the federal
Constitution.
Since the ratification of the Fourth Amendment, the United States
has recognized a need to limit government intrusion regarding and police
misconduct in investigative searches. 6  The Fourth Amendment
establishes credibility in our government by requiring that certain
standards be met before an investigative search begins. It also grants
citizens protection under the federal Constitution, the supreme law of the
land.7 The Fourth Amendment is vast and exemplifies true legal
ingenuity that all nations should observe.
In the Far East, China's role on the world stage has been receiving
increasing attention.8 As communist China continues to grow, so must
its economic, political and legal systems.9 While China has effectively
integrated democratic principles economically, it has struggled to form
sound political and legal systems.10
Politically, the recent acquisition of Hong Kong from the United
Kingdom placed China in a position where it had to incorporate
democratic principles in a communist state." China's solution was a
policy called "One Country, Two Systems."1 2  Legally, the "One
Country, Two Systems" policy lead China to create the Basic Law,' 3
which represents a separate constitution for Hong Kong.14
Despite the success and growth that communist China has recently
experienced, it has failed to protect Hong Kong citizens as extensively as
the United States protects its citizens.15 Although the Basic Law appears
to have democratic principles, in application the words are
3. See Richard A. Primus, When Should Original Meanings Matter? 107 MICH. L.
REv. 165, 200 (2008).
4. See U.S. CONsT. amend. IV; U.S. CONST. amend. V.
5. See U.S. CONsT. amend. IV.
6. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 356 (1967).
7. See Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137, 180 (1803).
8. See Stanley Lubman, Looking for Law in China, 20 COLUM. J. ASIAN L. 1, 4-11
(2006).
9. See id.
10. See infra Parts III, IV.
11. See Denis Chang, The Imperatives of One Country, Two Systems: One Country
before Two Systems? 37 HONG KONG L.J. 351, 352 (2007).
12. See id.
13. The Basic Law is the U.S. Consitution equivalent in Hong Kong. See Denis
Chang, The Imperatives of One Country, Two Systems: One Country before Two
Systems? 37 HONG KONG L.J. 351, 352 (2007).
14. See id.
15. See infra Parts III, IV.
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meaningless. 16  The Basic Law articles that pertain to government
searches are interpreted to allow judges to exercise discretion and
ultimately to ignore intrusive government actions, even if a citizen's
Basic Law rights have been breached."
This Comment identifies deficiencies in the Basic Law's protections
against government searches by comparing the Basic Law with the
Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution. Such a
comparative analysis is consistent with one purpose of comparative legal
analyses generally, namely, "be[ing] useful in the national law-making
process."18 After introducing "why a comparative analysis?" in Part I,
this Comment continues in Part II by examining the history behind the
Fourth Amendment.' 9 Part 11 will also examine the Hong Kong
equivalent of the Fourth Amendment by looking at the intent and text of
certain Basic Law articles. 20
Part III discusses judicial analysis of the constitutional law
applicable to government searches in both the United States and Hong
Kong.2' In particular, Fourth Amendment protection in the United States
requires that there be a search,22 and that the search be unreasonable.23
However, there are exceptions that allow searches to be conducted even
though they would ordinarily be considered unreasonable.24 In Hong
Kong, case law is scarce, and courts resort to foreign case law from the
United Kingdom, Canada and New Zealand.25 As a result, the merger
between the common law and the Basic Law yield a confusing test that
applies to situations involving government searches.26
Part IV of this Comment examines the differences in the substantive
law regarding government searches in the United States and Hong
Kong.27 Both systems have differences regarding when an individual has
a reasonable expectation of privacy.28 Both systems also have
differences regarding the admissibility of evidence.2 9  Furthermore,
where these two systems derive their legal principles may be the main
16. See infra Part III.B.
17. See infra Part III.B.
18. MARY A. GLEDON ET AL., COMPARATIVE LEGAL TRADITIONS IN A NUTSHELL 9-
12 (West Publ'g Co. 1982).
19. See infra Part II.A.
20. See infra Part II.B.1-2.
21. See infra Part III.
22. See infra Part III.A.1.
23. See infra Part III.A.2.
24. See infra Part III.A.3.
25. See infra notes 343, 349-53 and accompanying text.
26. See infra Part III.B.
27. See infra Part IV.
28. See infra Part IV.A.
29. See infra Part IV.B.
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cause of such divergent analyses in two countries that appear similar on
the surface. 30  Another difference is how each nation views its
constitution.3 1 The United States views its Constitution as the supreme
law of the land, whereas Hong Kong views the Basic Law as on par with
any other legal code.32 Finally, Part IV examines a landmark Hong Kong
case through the lens of Fourth Amendment legal rules and analysis.33
Part V concludes this Comment with a summary of how the intent,
text, and application of constitutional constraints on government searches
differ between the United States and Hong Kong.34 Part V also
concludes that historical and political factors35 may be responsible for the
significant differences between the two systems.36
II. AN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
In the United States, the Fourth Amendment has existed for more
than 200 years.3 Because the Fourth Amendment has existed for such a
long time, scholars believe originalism 38 is one of the better approaches
to Fourth Amendment analysis.39 Recently, the United States Supreme
Court stressed the importance of an originalist approach by stating that
"in determining whether a challenged police intrusion violates the Fourth
Amendment, [we] will 'inquire first whether the action was regarded as
an unlawful search or seizure under common law when the Amendment
was framed."' 4 0
In contrast, Hong Kong's Fourth Amendment equivalent has a
comparatively short legal history due to the implementation of the Basic
Law in 1997.41 The Basic Law is the supreme law of the land in Hong
Kong.42 As a result, political tensions have arisen between mainland
China's Constitution and Hong Kong's Basic Law despite the "One
30. See infra Part IV.C.
31. See infra Part IV.D.
32. See infra notes 403-4 and accompanying text.
33. See infra Part IV.E.
34. See infra Part V.
35. See infra Part V.
36. See infra Part V.
37. See Thomas Y. Davies, Recovering the Original Fourth Amendment, 99 MICH.
L. REv. 547, 557 (1999).
38. Originalism is described as "Prescriptive language is to be understood by
reference to evidence of the actual, contemporaneous mental states of the inscribers of the
language at issue." See Frederick Schauer, Defining Originalism, 19 HARV. J.L. & PUB.
POL'Y 343, 343 (1995).
39. See Primus, supra note 3, at 165.
40. See Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 299 (1999).




Country, Two Systems" policy.43 Due to the relatively short history of
Hong Kong's Fourth Amendment equivalent, emphasis should be placed
on the political tensions between China and Hong Kong when analyzing
the Basic Law, instead of on an originalist approach. Examining these
political tensions will help to show the intent of the Basic Law.
A. The United States and the Fourth Amendment
The Fourth Amendment states:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause,
supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the
place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized. 44
Irritated by the invasiveness of searches that British rulers were
authorizing,45 the framers of the United States Constitution set out to
write an amendment to protect against "general warrants that allowed
,,46expansive, unlimited police searches of persons and property. In
writing this amendment, the framers looked at similar provisions in the
individual states.47
The individual states were the first to adopt the "unreasonable
search and seizures" language.4 8 Massachusetts was the first to add
"unreasonable" before "search and seizures" in a 1780 law banning
general warrants49 issued by the legislature.5 0 "Unreasonable" in the late
eighteenth century "connoted illogic and inconsistency in a violation of a
rule or principle."
In the constitutional context, "unreasonable" evolved from the form
of "against reason," which had been used in noteworthy cases in Britain
43. See id.
44. U.S. CONsT. amend. IV.
45. See Davies, supra note 37, at 577.
46. Sammer Bajaj, note, Policing the Fourth Amendment: The Constitutionality of
Warrantless Investigatory Stops for Past Misdemeanors, 109 COLUM. L. REv. 309, 334
(2009).
47. See Davies, supra note 37, at 688.
48. See id.
49. A general warrant that gives a law enforcement officer broad authority to search
and seize unspecified places or persons. See BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 1616 (8th ed.
2004).
50. See Davies, supra note 37, at 684.
51. Davies, supra note 37, at 687 (citing A DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE
(1755) (unpaginated)).
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to "denounce violations of fundamental legal principle." 5 2 John Adams,
the founding father who personally drafted the Massachusetts search-
and-seizure provision, took the wording from James Otis's" 1761
argument during the Writs of Assistance Case. 4 In that case, Otis
argued against that the use of a general warrant to invade a private
residence stood "against reason."
Otis was not the sole critic of general warrants. Other common-law
authorities condemned such warrants as "unreasonable." For example, in
colonial Boston, a 1742 treatise on the law of arrest criticized the
"[u]nreasonableness, and seeming [u]nwarrantableness of [general
warrants]." 56 Moreover, when Judge William Blackstone17 discussed the
inherent rights of English subjects in his 1765 commentaries,58 he
invoked Lord Coke'S5 9  assertion that general warrants causing
imprisonment were "against reason" and converted "against reason" to
"[u]nreasonable." 60  Thus, the use of the term "unreasonable" to
52. See Davies, supra note 37, at 687 (citing Dr. Donham's Case, 8 Coke Rep. at
1 18a, 77 Eng. Rep. at 652 (1610), which elaborates on Coke's use of "against reason" as
a label of unconstitutionality).
53. James Otis, Jr. was a lawyer in colonial Massachusetts who was an early
advocate of the political views that led to the American Revolution. See ADAM G.
MERCER ET AL., JAMES OIs, THE PRE-REVOLUTIONIST (Diane Nafis & Don Nafis eds.,
2001).
54. See Davies, supra note 37, at 690 (citing John Adams, Argument and Report, in
2 LEGAL PAPERS OF JOHN ADAMS 123-44 (L. Kinvin Wroth & Hiller B. Zobel eds.,
1965)) (stating that John Adams adopted the wording from Otis's 1761 argument during
the Writs of Assistance Case, where Otis argued against the use of a general warrant to
invade one's ship or building and argued such use as "against reason").
55. See Davies, supra note 37, at 690 n.400 (1999) (citing John Adams, Argument
and Report, in 2 LEGAL PAPERS OF JOHN ADAMS 123-44 (L. Kinvin Wroth & Hiller B.
Zobel eds., 1965)).
56. See Davies, supra note 37, at 690 (quoting the Law of Arrests § 8, at 173-74
(London 1742). Adams apparently referred to this passage in his legal notes for a 1765
case. See John Adams, Argument and Report, in 1 LEGAL PAPERS OF JOHN ADAMS 102
n.74 (L. Kinvin Wroth & Hiller B. Zobel eds., 1965).
57. Sir William Blackstone (1723-1780) was a Judge of the Court of Common Pleas
and was considered a prominent legal scholar. His commentaries on the law of England
were often cited by the courts and were treated as authority. See David Nash Ford's
Royal Berkshire History, Sir William Blackstone (1723-1780), http://www.berkshire
history.com/bios/wblackstone.html (last visited Aug. 29, 2010).
58. See I WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 133
(1769), reprinted in WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND:
A FACSIMILE OF THE FIRST EDITION 1765-1769, at 133 (Stanley N. Katz ed., The
University of Chicago Press 1979).
59. Sir Edward Coke was a seventh-century judge and Member of Parliament whose
writings on the common law remained applicable 150 years after his death. See J.H.
BAKER, AN INTRODUCTION TO ENGLISH LEGAL HISTORY 167 (Oxford University Press
4th ed. 2002).
60. See Davies, supra note 37, at 692 (quoting I WILLIAM BLACKSTONE,
COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 133 (1769), reprinted in WILLIAM
[Vol. 29:1152
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condemn general warrants had been fairly established when Adams
wrote the 1780 Massachusetts provision.6 1
The term "unreasonable" carried to the federal level of government
when James Madison, the founding father who drafted many of the
proposals for the federal rights amendments, 62 drafted the proposal for
the Fourth Amendment.6 3 Some scholars believe that Madison adopted
"unreasonable" from the Massachusetts provision.64
Elsewhere in his proposal, Madison adopted the "probable cause"
standard, which had not been adopted in any previous state search-and-
seizure provision,65 but which was in fact taken from a 1786
66Pennsylvania statute. As to what property the amendment would cover,
Madison proposed extending seizure protection to "possessions."
However, "possessions" was eventually changed to the seemingly less
inclusive "effects" by the "Committee of Eleven" 68 of the House of
Representatives.69 At that time, "effects" was understood to mean
moveable goods or property (but not real property),70 which may show
that the Committee of Eleven intended a narrower term than
"possessions."7 1 But ultimately, the Fourth Amendment was adopted to
BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND: A FACSIMILE OF THE FIRST
EDITION 1765-1769, at 133 (Stanley N. Katz ed., The University of Chicago Press 1979)).
61. See Davies, supra note 37, at 692.
62. See id. at 696.
63. See id.
64. See id. at 695-96 (stating that Madison adopted parts of the Virginia
Constitution, which he also drafted, but that parts of the Virginia search-and-seizure
provision was taken from the Pennsylvania provision).
65. See id. at 703 (1999).
66. See Davies, supra note 37, at 703 n.444 (1999) (citing 30 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN.
§ 3 (1786), which stated that the Pennsylvania statute required a showing of "probable
cause" for granting a search warrant for a house to a national customs collector).
67. See id. at 708-11 (describing Madison's use of "property" as a broad
encompassing power to ensure citizens' protections against intrusion).
68. The Committee of Eleven was a special group consisting of one delegate from
each state. See BRITANNICA CONCISE ENCYCLOPEDIA: CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED
STATES (2008).
69. See Davies, supra note 37, at 7 10-11 (citing House Committee of Eleven Report
(July 28, 1789), reprinted in THE COMPLETE BILL OF RIGHTS: THE DRAFTS, DEBATES,
SOURCES, AND ORIGINS 223-24 (6.1.1.2)(Neil H. Cogan ed., 1997) (noting that this was
the only deliberate and significant change made to Madison's proposal that resulted in
today's "effects" as seen in the U.S. Constitution)).
70. See Davies, supra note 37, at 711 (citing Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170,
177 n.7 (1984)).
71. There is scholarly debate over the terms "possession" and "effects" and whether
either is actually broader or narrower than the other. See Akhil Reed Amar, The Bill of
Rights as a Constitution, 100 YALE L.J. 1131, 1167 (1991).
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protect citizens against "political violence,"72 such as unreasonable and
unwarranted government intrusion.
In conclusion, the ratifiers of the Fourth Amendment adopted much
of its language from the individual states.73 The states are believed to
have adopted their language from legal scholars in Britain who opposed
certain legal devices employed by Britain's government.74  Thus, the
Fourth Amendment's origins are bound up with rebellious legal scholars
of the eighteenth century.75
B. Hong Kong's Equivalent to the Fourth Amendment of the United
States
1. The Intent of the Basic Law of Hong Kong
Before 1978, China was a strict communist nation. It was separate
from Hong Kong,76 which was a British colony.77 In 1978, China
underwent political, economic and legal reforms.78 It adopted a market-
oriented economy through Deng Xiaoping' S79 "Four Modernizations."so
Political and legal reforms accompanied the adoption of the Constitution
of the People's Republic of China in 1982.81
In 1984, the Sino-British Joint Declaration82 ("Joint Declaration")
granted the government of the People's Republic of China ("PRC")
control over Hong Kong effective July 1, 1997.83 Hong Kong became
the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region ("HKSAR") of the
72. Bruce P. Smith, The Fourth Amendment, 1789-1868: A Strange History, 5 OHIO
ST. J. CRIM. L. 663, 664 (2008).
73. See supra notes 40-66 and accompanying text.
74. See supra notes 52-63 and accompanying text.
75. See supra note 53.
76. See Sun Zhichao, International Legal Personality of the Hong Kong Special
Administrative Region, 7 CHINESE J. INT'L L. 339, 1 10 (2008).
77. See id.
78. See Sang Woo Lee, Note, An Obligation to Act: When the U.S. Voices Concern
About China's Criminal Justice System, 20 TEMP. INT'L & COMP. L.J. 591, 591 (2006).
79. Deng Xiaoping was a prominent Chinese politician, statesmen, theorist and
diplomat. As a leader of the Communist Party of China, he became a reformer who led
China towards market economics. See Michael Yahuda, Deng Xiaoping: The Statesman,
THE CHINA QUARTERLY, Sep. 1993, at 551-572.
80. See Lee, supra note 78, at 591 (quoting JONATHAN D. SPENCE, THE SEARCH FOR
MODERN CHINA 704 (Norton 1990)).
81. See id. at 591.
82. The Joint Declaration was an agreement between the PRC and Britain where
both governments would exchange the exercise of sovereignty over Hong Kong on July
1, 1997 (from Britain to PRC). The PRC Government also declared its basic policies
regarding Hong Kong in the Joint Declaration. See http://www.hkbu.edu.hk/-pchksar/
JD/jd-full l.htm, 1 (introduction).
83. See Zhichao, supra note 76, at 1.
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84 .,,85 "O nePRC,84 under the principle of "One Country, Two Systems.
Country" meant that power would remain with the central authorities of
the PRC,86 while "Two Systems" meant that the PRC would grant Hong
Kong a high degree of "autonomy." 87 "Autonomy" meant that Hong
Kong would continue to use the common-law system in effect during the
days of British colonial rule. 8 In addition, the British and Chinese
governments agreed to establish a Joint Liaison Group that was
responsible for consulting on the implementation, through legal
formulations, of the Joint Declaration between the PRC and Hong
Kong. 89
Before China regained control in 1997 through the Joint
Declaration, Hong Kong had been under British colonial rule for more
than 150 years. 9 0 The Basic Law faithfully incorporates most of the
requirements of the Joint Declaration and tries to expressly secure the
rule of law in Hong Kong through continued implementation of the
common law.91 However, the PRC has not given complete autonomy to
Hong Kong. As a result, major issues linger concerning interpretation of
the Basic Law in a system that has a mixture of communist and
democratic values. 9 2 For instance, liberal human-rights guarantees are
adequately provided for but are put at risk by national-security and
public-order provisions elsewhere in the Basic Law.93 Moreover, the
PRC can overturn the decisions of Hong Kong's courts 94 by the use of
the Standing Committee.95
The Standing Committee's power to interpret the Basic Law
endangers the "One Country, Two Systems" policy by making the policy
84. XIANGGANG JI BEN FA Art. 1.
85. See XIANGGANG JI BEN FA Art. 5. See also Sun Zhichao, International Legal
Personality of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, 7 CHINESE J. INT'L L. 339,
339 (2008) (stating that "One Country, Two Systems" principle means the socialist
system and policies will not be practiced in Hong Kong).
86. See Chang, supra note 11, at 352.
87. See XIANGGANG Jl BEN FA Art. 12.
88. See infra notes 345-358 and accompanying text.
89. See Zhichao, supra note 76, at 12.
90. See id. I 10.
91. See Michael C. Davis, The Basic Law and Democratization in Hong Kong, 3
Loy. U. CHI. INT'L L. REv. 165, 177 (2006).
92. See id.
93. See id.
94. See id. at 177-78.
95. The Standing Committee is a committee of about 150 members of the National
People's Congress (NPC) of the PRC. The committee has constitutional authority to
modify legislation within limits set by the NPC and thus acts as a de facto legislative
body. The Standing Committee also has the power to interpret the laws of PRC,
including the Basic Law of Hong Kong. See XIAN FA arts. 57-61, 65-69 (2004) (P.R.C).
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little more than a hypocritical statement. 9 6  In particular, one scholar
noted that the PRC can file a motion with the Standing Committee to
reinterpret the Basic Law and effectively overturn any provision, thereby
affecting the outcome of a case on appeal.9 7 The PRC's ability to
overturn cases at any time may jeopardize the system established by the
Joint Declaration.9 8 The Joint Declaration is meant to retain the
democratic system that existed under British colonial rule before Britain
agreed to cede Hong Kong to China.99 However, easily overturned cases
will be a drastic departure from more democratic systems like the legal
systems of Britain and the United States. In a system such as the United
States, the Constitution (which is the Basic Law equivalent) cannot be
overturned by any committee but has specific provisions dealing with
amending the Constitution itself.'00
Although there have been no reports of the Standing Committee
overturning cases involving Article 28'0' or Article 30102 of the Basic
Law, there would be ideological ramifications to the Joint Declaration as
a result of a case being overturned. 0 3 For example, it is plausible that if
the Standing Committee were comprised of politically corrupt
individuals or of individuals fearful of the PRC, the Standing Committee
could overturn a law at the PRC's behest. This would result in an
unstable legal system.' 04 Unlike Hong Kong, the United States ensures
that the rights of its citizens are protected from political violence by
honoring the Constitution as the supreme law of the land, 05 amendable
only as stated in the Constitution itself.10 6
96. See Davis, supra note 91, at 177.
97. See id. at 183-84.
98. See XIAN FA arts. 57-61, 65-69 (2004) (P.R.C.).
99. See Chang, supra note 11, at 352.
100. See U.S. CONST. art. V.
101. Article 28 of the Basic Law is one of two relevant Basic Law provisions for the
analysis. See infra notes 107-10 and accompanying text.
102. See XIANGGANG JI BEN FA Art. 30.
103. The implications are obvious. For example, an individual may be convicted of a
crime based on unlawfully seized evidence from an unlawful search. If a high court
decides to overturn the lower court and grant the individual freedom because of corrupt
government actions, the standing committee has the right to overturn that judgment,
forcing the individual to remain in jail while the government perpetrates corrupt acts.
This is mere speculation, but the result is plausible. See Michael C. Davis, The Basic
Law and Democratization in Hong Kong, 3 Loy. U. CHI. INT'L L. REV. 165, 183-84
(2006).
104. Legal scholars have discussed the possibility of the standing committee
overturning cases. See Michael C. Davis, The Basic Law and Democratization in Hong
Kong, 3 LOY. U. CHI. INT'L L. REv. 165, 183-84 (2006). However, I am merely
speculating on a potential scenario.
105. See Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137, 180 (1803).
106. Corrupt government actions, such as unlawful law-enforcement procedures to
search individuals and homes, are rendered fruitless and thus deterred because of the
156 [Vol. 29:1
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2. The Text of the Basic Law of Hong Kong
Two articles in the Basic Law of Hong Kong resemble the Fourth
Amendment of the United states Constitution. 0 7 The first is Article 28,
entitled "The freedom of the person of Hong Kong Residents shall be
inviolable."' 08 Article 28 states:
No Hong Kong resident shall be subject to arbitrary or unlawful
arrest, detention or imprisonment. Arbitrary or unlawful search of
the body of any resident or deprivation or restriction of the freedom
of the person shall be prohibited. Torture of any resident or arbitrary
or unlawful deprivation of the life of any resident shall be
prohibited.109
The second sentence is the most relevant here because it pertains to
searches.110
Textual differences exist between the Fourth Amendment and
Article 28 of the Basic Law."' The first difference is the expansive
definition that the Fourth Amendment gives the word "search."ll 2 As a
result, the plain meaning of the Fourth Amendment provides more
protection than Article 28. The Basic Law only focuses on the unlawful
search of the body," 3 whereas the Fourth Amendment adds "houses,
papers, and effects."ll 4
A second textual difference pertains to the word "arbitrary" in
Article 28 and the word "unreasonable" in the Fourth Amendment."'
According to Black's Law Dictionary, "arbitrary" is defined as
"depending on individual discretion ... determined by a judge rather
than by fixed rules, procedures, or law."ll 6 "Unreasonable" is defined as
"not guided by reason; irrational or capricious."" 7 According to its plain
proactive nature of the Fourth Amendment. It is not worth the time for law enforcement
to create new procedures if it is possible that they will not comport with the Fourth
Amendment.
107. See U.S. Const. amend. IV; XIANGGANG JI BEN FA arts. 28 & 30.
108. XIANGGANG JI BEN FA art. 28.
109. Id. (emphasis added).
110. The Fourth Amendment deals with searches and seizures. For the purposes of
this Comment, there will be only an analysis of the search aspect of the Fourth
Amendment. Since this is a comparative analysis, it only matters what part of Hong
Kong's Basic Law pertains to a search analysis. The other two sentences deal with
detention and torture, both of which may have more to do with Fifth Amendment rights
such as Miranda rights.
111. See U.S. Const. amend. IV; XIANGGANG J1 BEN FA art. 28.
112. See supra notes 70-90 and accompanying text.
113. See XIANGGANG JI BEN FA art. 28.
114. U.S. CONsT. amend. IV.
115. See U.S. CONST. amend. IV. See also XIANGGANG JI BEN FA arts. 28 & 30.
116. BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 112 (8th ed. 2004).
117. Id. at 1574.
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meaning, "arbitrary" would seem to allow for searches based on
potentially flawed procedures, provided the searches were not initiated at
an individual's discretion. In the United States, the source of the
government's right to search the individual does not matter. If the source
is irrational, then it will be superseded by the Fourth Amendment. In
other words, the Fourth Amendment provides a defendant an opportunity
to overturn a government procedure if the procedure is interpreted to be
irrational. Hong Kong's use of the word "arbitrary" does not necessarily
provide the same opportunity.'
China chose different words that, at their very foundation, appear to
have different definitions and potentially different outcomes.1 19 Unlike
the United States, Hong Kong was not trying to rebel from Britain and
therefore had no reason to follow the common law as influenced by Otis
and Blackstone.120  The lack of a rebellious attitude could be one
explanation for such differences despite the fact that Hong Kong and the
United States were originally influenced by British colonial rule.12 1 This
also supports the aforementioned notion that the rebellious legal scholars
of Britain had a profound influence on the Fourth Amendment.122
Most interestingly, both the United States and Hong Kong,
historically, were British colonies, but both currently have dissimilar
laws.123 This divergence can be analogized to divergent evolutionary
lineages.12 4 The United States and Hong Kong represent two different
species derived from the same common ancestor (Britain). Over time the
United States and Hong Kong split into two distinct species. The causes
of this divergence may include rebellious legal scholarship on the one
hand, and "One Country, Two Systems" on the other.
The Court of Final Appeal 25 in Hong Kong has briefly discussed
Article 28 thus:
118. See supra notes 40-80 and accompanying text.
119. As evidenced by the plain-meaning analysis conducted in this Comment.
120. Hong Kong was a part of Great Britain until the implementation of the Joint
Declaration. See Sun Zhichao, International Legal Personality of the Hong Kong Special
Administrative Region, 7 CHINESE J. INT'L L. 339 (2008). The U.S. broke away from
Britain with the Declaration of Independence. See THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE
(U.S. 1776).
121. See Yash Ghai, The Intersection of Chinese Law and the Common Law in the
Hong Kong Special Administrative Region: Question of Technique or Politics? 37 HONG
KONG L.J. 363, 367 (2007).
122. See supra note 53 and accompanying text.
123. See supra notes 40-100 and accompanying text.
124. The analogous theory to scientific evolution represents my thinking on the issue.
125. This Court is the equivalent to a Circuit Court of Appeals in the United States.
See THE BLUEBOOK: A UNIFORM SYSTEM Of CITATION 275 tbl.T.2 (Columbia Law
Review Ass'n et al. eds., 16th ed. 9th prtg. 1999).
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[Article 28] is found in chap. III of the Basic Law which sets out the
fundamental rights and freedoms which are constitutionally
guaranteed and which lie at the heart of Hong Kong's separate
system.... [T]hese provisions should be generously interpreted to
ensure that Hong Kong residents enjoy the full measure of those
rights and freedoms. ... Article 28 prohibits not merely
'unlawful' . . . but 'arbitrary or unlawful.' . . . [S]uch arbitrariness
may reside in the substantive rules of criminal liability. . . . [A]rt.28
was capable of invalidating, on the grounds of arbitrariness,
substantive criminal laws. . . . '[A]rbitrary' turned on the nature and
extent of any departure from the substantive and procedural standards
involved ... arbitrary if it was capricious, unreasoned, or without
reasonable cause, that was, if it was made without reference to an
adequate determining principle or without following proper
procedures. 'Arbitrariness' was not to be equated with 'against the
law', but must be interpreted more broadly to include elements of
inappropriateness, injustice and lack ofpredictability. . . .12 6
The above quote from Lau Cheong & Another v. HKSAR1 2 7 explains the
scope of Hong Kong's search provision. 128 According to the Court of
Final Appeal, the mere inappropriateness of a rule regarding a search of
items, for example, may be grounds for striking down the rule even
though a police officer followed the rule properly. 12 9
Another relevant doctrine for searches is Article 30130 of the Basic
Law. Article 30 states:
The freedom and privacy of communication of Hong Kong residents
shall be protected by law. No department or individual may, on any
grounds, infringe upon the freedom and privacy of communications
of residents except that the relevant authorities may inspect
communication in accordance with legal procedures to meet the
needs of public security or of investigation into criminal offences. 3
Article 30 importantly clarifies Hong Kong's accepted definition of
"search." In line with the holding in the U.S. case of Katz v. United
126. Lau Cheong & Another v. HKSAR, [2002] 2 H.K.L.R.D. 612, 614-627 (C.F.A.)
(emphasis added).
127. The defendant in this case argued to the Court of Final Appeal that his
conviction was unconstitutional because the grievous-harm rule under the Hong Kong
murder statute was "arbitrary." Although the facts are different the Court goes into an
extensive discussion of the term "arbitrary" within the provisions of Article 28 of the
Basic Law. See Lau Cheong & Another v. HKSAR, [2002] 2 H.K.L.R.D. 612, 614-627
(C.F.A.).
128. See id.
129. See id. at 627.
130. See XIANGGANG J1 BEN FA art. 30.
131. Id.
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States,13 2 a search in Hong Kong occurs if the government listens to
audio communications or surveys actions visually portrayed via video
surveillance.13 3 In contrast, the Fourth Amendment is considered a part
of the penumbra of rights that create the right of privacy in the United
States. 134
To understand Article 30, we must take stock of how courts
interpret it. Article 30 has been read by the Court of Appeal of the High
Court in HSKAR v. Chan Kau Tai'35 to apply only to audio
communications. 136  The Chan Kau Tai Court also carved out an
exception to Article 30137 by holding that a government agency may
interfere with the right of privacy of communications if there is a legal
procedure in place authorizing the use of surveillance for criminal
investigations.138 In Chan Kau Tai, however, the Court held that the
defendant's right of privacy had been infringed because no such legal
procedure was in place.13 1
There are several foundational differences between the search
provisions of the Hong Kong and United States constitutions.140 The
United States has one amendment that covers search-related issues.141
Hong Kong, conversely, has at least two applicable constitutional
provisions. 142 Furthermore, the words used under each system are
different1 4 3 and, as a result, lead to different results when applied to the
same set of facts.14 4
III. CONDUCTING A CONSTITUTIONAL CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
ANALYSIS
A. The United States
A plain-meaning analysis of the Fourth Amendment leaves many
questions unanswered. The amendment's plain meaning allows searches
132. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 347 (1967).
133. See XIANGGANG JI BEN FA art. 30. See also Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347,
347 (1967).
134. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 113 (1973).
135. See HSKAR v. Chan Kau Tai, [2006] 1 H.K.L.R.D. 400, 400 (C.A.).
136. See id. at 437 (C.A.).
137. See id.
138. See id.
139. See Chan Kau Tai, [2006] 1 H.K.L.R.D. at 441.
140. See supra notes 40-130 and accompanying text.
141. See U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
142. See XIANGGANG JI BEN FA arts. 28 & 30.
143. See supra notes 40-114 and accompanying text.
144. See infra notes 416-24 and accompanying text.
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as long as they are reasonable.14 5 Over the years, the United States
Supreme Court has created tests that determine whether a search has
taken place1 46 and whether a search is unreasonable. 14 7 The Court has
also crafted exceptions by which some searches, which would ordinarily
be deemed unreasonable, may be deemed reasonable. 14 8
1. Defining a Search
The legal definition of "search" was established in the 1960s in Katz
v. United States.14 9  In Katz, the petitioner was found guilty of
transmitting betting information by telephone from Los Angeles to
Miami and Boston in violation of a federal statute.5 o At trial, the
prosecution was permitted to introduce evidence of the petitioner's
telephone conversations that had been overheard by FBI agents who had
attached an electronic listening-and-recording device outside of the
public telephone booth from which the petitioner made the calls.' 5' The
Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit rejected the petitioner's
argument that the recordings had been obtained in violation of the Fourth
Amendment because there had been no physical intrusion into the area
the petitioner occupied.152 The United States Supreme Court considered
the issues, formulated by the petitioner, of whether: (1) the public
telephone booth was constitutionally protected under the Fourth
Amendment; and (2) the physical penetration of a constitutionally
protected area was necessary for a violation of the Constitution to
occur.' 53 The Supreme Court explicitly rejected the formulation of the
issues presented in the petitioner's briefl 54 and stated that
[T]he Fourth Amendment protects people, not places. What a person
knowingly exposes in public, even in his own home or office, is not a
subject of Fourth Amendment protection. But what he seeks to
preserve as private, even in an area accessible to the public, may be
constitutionally protected. 55
145. See infra notes 160-250 and accompanying text.
146. See infra notes 149-82 and accompanying text.
147. See infra 182-250 ad accompanying text.
148. See, e.g., Bond v. United States, 529 U.S. 334, 338 (2000); Smith v. Maryland,
442 U.S. 735, 735 (1979); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 347 (1967); Brinegar v.
United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175-76 (1949).
149. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 347 (1967).
150. See id. at 348.
151. See id.
152. See id. at 348-49.
153. See id. at 349-51.
154. See Katz, 389 U.S. at 350.
155. Id. at 351 (1967) (emphasis added, citations omitted).
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The Court's holding was clarified by Justice Harlan's concurring opinion
where he stated the two-part requirement "first that a person have
exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy and, second, that
the expectation be one that society is prepared to recognize as
'reasonable."' 56 The Court found that the Government had performed a
search under the Fourth Amendment because the petitioner had sought to
exclude the "uninvited ear,"' 5 ' and the act of closing the telephone-booth
door allowed the petitioner to reasonably assume, as society would agree,
that his conversation would be in private.
The two-part test for reasonable expectation of privacyl 59
established in Katz,160 was refined in subsequent Supreme Court cases.
In Smith v. Maryland,161 the Court clarified the test by identifying
relevant factors to be applied in the analysis.' 62 In Smith, a woman who
was robbed and who had received threatening telephone calls by the
petitioner gave police the petitioner's license-plate number when she
caught the petitioner stalking her. 63  Using the license-plate number,
police located the petitioner's home. 164 The police then requested that
the telephone company install a pen register, which would record the
numbers the petitioner dialed from his home phone.165 The pen register
confirmed that the petitioner was the individual who was making the
threatening phone calls,166 and the pen-register tape was admitted into
evidence against the petitioner.167  The issue before the Court was
whether the installation and use of the pen register constituted a search
within the Fourth Amendment.16 8 The Court held that the installation
and use of the pen register was not a search within the Fourth
Amendment for several reasons.169
First, the Court rejected the petitioner's argument that he had an
actual, or subjective, expectation of privacy when he dialed numbers on
156. Id. at 361.
157. See id. at 352.
158. See id.
159. The Concurrence in Katz v. United States lead to the adoption of the two-prong
test for "reasonable expectation of privacy." The first prong is called the actual or
subjective prong. The second prong is called the reasonable or objective prong. The
former looks to the defendant's thoughts and actions, while the latter looks to see if those
actions and thoughts are the kind that society deems "reasonable."
160. See Katz, 389 U.S. at 350.
161. Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 735 (1979).
162. See id.
163. See id. at 737.
164. See id.
165. See id.
166. See Smith, 442 U.S. at 737.
167. See id. at 738.
168. See id. at 736.
169. See id. at 745-46.
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his phone.170  The Court considered whether other individuals in the
petitioner's situation would understand that they had to convey
information (in this case, telephone numbers) to a third party.'
Applying this standard to the facts, the Court determined that individuals
in the petitioner's situation would recognize that the telephone numbers
they dialed were shown on their billing statements. Thus they could not
subjectively believe they had a privacy right.172 Other factors that were
considered in the subjective-expectation prong included whether one
realizes that the third party with whom he or she interacts has the ability
to make permanent records of the information being disputed1 73 and
whether the device is generally used by the public.174 A factor that the
Court found as irrelevant to the subjective prong was the location of the
activity, specifically when the content searched was in a public place. 1 75
The Supreme Court stated that, even if the petitioner had a
subjective expectation of privacy, that expectation was not one that
society was "prepared to recognize as 'reasonable."'l 7 6 In making this
determination, the Court considered whether the individual turned over
information to a third party. At the same time, a factor the United
States Supreme Court held irrelevant was whether the information was
conveyed through automation.
Subsequent cases have shown what factors courts should consider in
determining whether there has been a search.179 Under the subjective-
expectation analysis, courts determine whether the object that was
allegedly searched was one "which the person tried to keep close at
170. See Smith, 442 U.S. at 742.
171. See id. (stating that there is no privacy when the public knows of it).
172. See id.
173. See id. (stating that the petitioner should have known that telephone companies
kept records of telephone numbers dialed for billing purposes).
174. See id. at 743 (stating that pen registers are in common use in the U.S. for
recording data for billing purposes).
175. See Smith, 442 U.S. at 744 (once the item is in the general public, it is no longer
private, and, therefore, the reasonable expectation of privacy is lost along with the Fourth
Amendment protection).
176. Id. at 743 (citing Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967)).
178. See id. at 744 (giving information can reasonably lead to a loss of privacy).
179. See Smith, 442 U.S. at 745 (1979) (stating that recording by operator or by pen
register is irrelevant for Fourth Amendment analysis).
179. See Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 29 (2001); Bond v. United States, 529
U.S. 334, 338 (2000).
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hand."180 Also, courts should consider whether the effect was placed in
an opaque container.ist
Under the objective-expectation prong, courts examine whether the
inspection was tactile as opposed to visual. 18 2 The analysis takes into
account the totality of the circumstances,183 and future Supreme Court
cases will continue to add factors to the analysis.184
2. Defining Unreasonable Searches
If a government action does not constitute a search, then the Fourth
Amendment affords the individual no protection.185  However, when
there is a search, it must be reasonable. 18 6  The Fourth Amendment
protects citizens only from "unreasonable searches."' 8 7  The plain
meaning of the Fourth Amendment indicates that for a search to be
reasonable it must be accompanied by a warrant that is based on probable
cause, that is supported by oath or affirmation, and that particularly
describes the place to be searched.188
a. The Probable Cause Requirement for Searches
The probable-cause requirement pertains to both searches and
seizures.189 Probable cause has two separate and distinct standards for
searches and seizures.190 Generally, probable cause to search requires "a
certain quantum of likelihood that: [1] something that is properly subject
to seizure by the government, i.e., contraband or fruits, instrumentalities,
or evidence of a crime, [2] is presently [3] in the specific place to be
searched."l 91 The following cases reveal the complexity of the probable-
cause standard.
180. See Bond v. United States, 529 U.S. 334, 338 (2000) (holding that a bag in
overhead storage is an object that the petitioner can expect to remain private, but an
object stored under the bus cannot be expected to remain private).
181. See id. (holding that a clear bag exposes the object to the public, consequently
losing its Fourth Amendment protection).
182. See id. at 337-38 (stating that the act of feeling for an object that is not visible to
the public may be in violation of the Fourth Amendment).
183. See Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 215 (1983).
184. See Bond v. United States, 529 U.S. 334, 337-38 (2000).
185. See supra notes 161-67 and accompanying text.
186. See infra notes 203-241 and accompanying text.
187. U.S. CONsT. amend. IV.
188. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
189. See WELSH S. WHITE & JAMES J. TOMKOVICZ, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE:
CONSTITUTIONAL CONSTRAINTS UPON INVESTIGATION AND PROOF 49 (Lexis Nexis 6th ed.
2008) (1994).
190. For the purposes of this analysis, the relevant standard will be the probable-cause
standard for searches. See id.
191. See id. at 49-50.
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In Brinegar v. United States, the United States Supreme Court
clarified the test used to determine whether there is probable cause to
conduct a search.192 In Brinegar, an investigator for the Alcohol Tax
Unit was parked in a car along the Oklahoma-Missouri border when the
defendant drove by in his Ford coupe.193 The investigator had arrested
the defendant five months earlier for illegal importation of alcohol, had
witnessed the defendant load liquor into the trunk of his car on two
occasions over the preceding six months, and knew the defendant had a
reputation for carrying liquor.' 94  The investigator testified that the
defendant sped up as he drove past and that the rear of the defendant's
car looked "heavily loaded."' 95 The investigator began to chase the
defendant for a mile at top speed until the defendant swerved off the
road.196 Once stopped, the defendant admitted to the investigator that
there was alcohol in the vehicle. 197 He was subsequently arrested, and
the alcohol was seized.' 98
The defendant was convicted of importing liquor into Oklahoma
from Missouri in violation of a federal statute.'99 The question presented
to the Court was whether there was probable cause to search the
defendant's car.2 00 The Court held that there was probable cause for the
search (and subsequent arrest) based on a totality-of-the-circumstances
approach. 2 0 1 Under this approach, the Court held that the probable-cause
standard required a fair probability that the evidence in existence at the
time of the search would suggest an illegal act had occurred.202  The
Brinegar Court found that such a probability existed, given that the
investigator had witnessed the defendant load liquor into the car on
previous occasions, had arrested the defendant for a similar violation
previously, and observed the defendant traveling to the state border.20 3
The totality-of-the-circumstances approach stated in Brinegar was vague
and did not specify what a court should consider when determining
whether a fair probability existed for law enforcement to search an
individual.
192. See Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175-76 (1949).
193. See id. at 161-62.
194. See id. at 163.
195. See id.
196. See id.
197. See Brinegar, 338 U.S. at 163.
198. See id.
199. See id. at 161.
200. See id. at 164.
201. See id. at 176.
202. See Brinegar, 338 U.S. at 175-76.
203. See id. at 169-70.
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Another case that clarifies the probable-cause standard but that also
adds irrelevant factors to the probable-cause analysis is Whren v. United
States.204 Whren involved a traffic-law violation that led to a traffic stop
and drug bust.20 5 The question presented to the Supreme Court was
whether the traffic violation sufficed as probable cause to search for
drugs.206 The Court held the stop was reasonable under the Fourth
Amendment.207 The Court rejected the petitioner's argument that the
subjective intentions of the officer should be considered during probable-
cause analysis under the Fourth Amendment.208 Moreover, the Court
held that racial profiling is irrelevant in probable-cause analysis and that
such an issue should be dealt with under the Equal Protection Clause, not
the Fourth Amendment.2 09 Whren helps to clarify the probable-cause
standard by showing what evidence courts should not consider.2 10
b. The Warrant Requirement
The plain meaning of the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement
is that a valid warrant for a search must be based on probable cause,211
must describe the particular place of the search, describe the particular
thing to be seized,2 12 and must be supported by oath or affirmation.2 1 3
Case law has added another requirement, namely, that the warrant be
issued by a neutral and detached magistrate.2 14 However, this
requirement is not explicitly mentioned in the Fourth Amendment.2 15
In Groh v. Ramirez,2 16 the Supreme Court set forth the requirements
for a valid search warrant.2 17 Groh, an agent for the Bureau of Alcohol,
Tobacco, and Firearms, prepared an application for a warrant to search a
ranch for automatic firearms, automatic weapons parts, destructive
204. See Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 806 (1996).
205. See id. at 808.
206. See id.
207. See id. at 819.
208. See id. at 813.
209. See Whren, 517 U.S. at 813.
210. See id.
211. See supra notes 140-80 and accompanying text.
212. The particularity requirements for both searches and seizures are relatively
similar. The difference is simply whether description is for a place or an item to be
seized. Nonetheless, the major similarity is that the scope of authority that a police
officer has with regards to the search must be within the bounds of the warrant. See
Atwater v. Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 321 (2001).
213. See WELSH S. WHITE & JAMES J. TOMKOVICZ, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE:
CONSTITUTIONAL CONSTRAINTS UPON INVESTIGATION AND PROOF 122-125 (Lexis Nexis
6th ed. 2008) (1994).
214. See id.
215. See id.
216. See Groh v. Ramirez, 540 U.S. 551, 551 (2004).
217. See id. at 555.
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devices, and receipts pertaining to the purchase of these items.218 Groh
then submitted the application, a detailed affidavit, and a completed
warrant form to a magistrate. The magistrate signed the warrant form.2 19
Although the warrant application described the contraband that was
sought, the warrant itself did not.220 The warrant only described the
defendant's house as the place to be searched; it made no mention of the
stockpile of weapons.221 The warrant did state that the magistrate was
satisfied that the affidavit established probable cause.222 A search of the
premises turned up no illegal weapons or explosives.223
The Groh Court held that the warrant was invalid and that the
search was unreasonable.224  The Court found that the warrant had
"complied with the first three . . . requirements: it was based on probable
cause, supported by a sworn affidavit, and it described particularly the
place of the search. On the fourth requirement [of particularly describing
the things to be seized], however, the warrant failed altogether. ... 225
Furthermore, the Court found that "the warrant did not simply omit a few
items or misdescribe a few of several items. . . . It stated that the items
consisted of a 'single dwelling residence . . . blue in color.' In other
words, the warrant did not describe the items to be seized at all."226 The
Court rejected the Government's argument that the particularity
requirement was satisfied by a warrant application describing the items
to be seized.227
Several important conclusions are to be drawn from Groh. First, the
Court reaffirmed the need for probable cause, the need for an affidavit to
show probable cause, and the need for both the place to be searched and
the items to be seized to be particularly described in the warrant.228
Second, an oath or affirmation is the affidavit requirement. 229  Third,
warrants themselves (both for search and seizure) must describe the
Government's scope of authority; this can be done by specifying what
item will be seized. 230 For example, a warrant may state the Government
plans to search a law-school building on a specific date in order to seize a
machine gun. Essentially, the scope of the warrant would limit the
218. See id. at 554.
219. See id.
220. See id
221. See Groh, 540 U.S. at 554.
222. See id. at 555.
223. See id.
224. See id. at 563.
225. See id. at 557.
226. See Groh, 540 U.S. at 558.





PENN STATE INTERNATIONAL LAW REVIEW
search to places within the building that could contain a machine gun.
For example, the Government could not search a small backpack lying in
a hallway because a machine gun does not fit in a small backpack. The
implication is that the larger the object, the narrower the Government's
search must be. 2 31 Even if all four of the warrant requirements be
satisfied, the Government still needs a neutral and detached magistrate to
issue the warrant.232
Although issues regarding the neutrality of magistrates are rare,233
the Supreme Court addressed one directly in Connolly v. Georgia.234 In
Connolly, the Court held that the actions of a magistrate judge who, in
light of a Georgia statute,235 received five dollars for issuing a warrant
but no compensation for refusing to issue one, were constitutionally
impermissible.2 36 Furthermore, the Court held that the magistrate must
also be "detached" from, or not affiliated with, law enforcement.237
3. Exceptions that Make a Search Reasonable
Exceptions to the Fourth Amendment search provision can be
divided into two categories: exceptions to the warrant requirement, and
exceptions to the probable-cause requirement.
a. Exceptions to the Warrant Requirement: Exigent
Circumstances and Plain View Doctrine
Normally, a government search requires the execution of a warrant
that is based on probable cause,238 that describes the particular place of
the search, that describes the particular thing to be seized,2 39 and that is
231. See Groh, 540 U.S. at 557.
232. See id.
233. See WELSH S. WHITE & JAMES J. TOMKOVICZ, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE:
CONSTITUTIONAL CONSTRAINTS UPON INVESTIGATION AND PROOF 125 (Lexis Nexis 6th
ed. 2008) (1994).
234. See Connolly v. Georgia, 429 U.S. 245, 245 (1977).
235. See id. at 246 (quoting GA. CODE ANN. s 24-1601 (1971) (stating that under the
Georgia Statute, the fee for the issuance of a search warrant by a Georgia justice of the
peace "shall be" $5, "and it shall be lawful for said (justice) of the peace to charge and
collect the same." If the requested warrant is refused, the justice of the peace collects no
fee for reviewing and denying the application)). This created an incentive for justices to
issue warrants. Id.
236. See id. at 251.
237. See id. at 248-50.
238. See supra notes 112-186 and accompanying text.
239. The particularity requirements for both searches and seizures are relatively
similar. The difference is simply whether the description is for a place or an item to be
seized. Nonetheless, the major similarity is that the scope of authority that a police
officer has with regards to the search must be within the bounds of the warrant. See
Atwater v. Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 321 (2001).
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supported by oath or affirmation.240 However, when exigent
circumstances arise, the government need not get a warrant before
executing a search.24'
The case on point is Warden v. Hayden.24 2 In Warden, an armed
robber stole money from a cab company and ran to a house on a
particular street.24 3 Police pursued and, after getting consent by Mrs.
Hayden to enter the house, found the armed robber feigning sleep.244
While the officers arrested the defendant, another officer searched the
cellar "for a man or the money" and found clothes in a washing machine
similar to the clothes worn during the robbery.24 5 Furthermore, another
officer heard running water in a bathroom next to the room in which the
defendant had been arrested and found a shotgun and pistol in the flush
tank.246 All of these items were introduced as evidence against the
defendant at trial.247
The Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit, which had ruled that the search of the defendant and entry into
the home without a warrant were valid.24 8 The Court noted that "the
exigencies of the situation made that course imperative." 2 49 The Court
noted that the police were informed that an armed robbery had taken
place, and that the police entered a house that the defendant entered only
five minutes earlier. 2 50 The Court stated that "[t]he Fourth Amendment
does not require police officers to delay in the course of an investigation
if to do so would gravely endanger their lives or the lives of others." 25 1
However, the Court clarified that the "[s]cope of the search must ... be
as broad as may reasonably be necessary to prevent the dangers that the
suspect at large in the house may resist or escape."252 In other words, the
search can go as far as the police may need it to go in order to stop the
suspect and prevent further danger. In Warden, the police officer who
searched the washing machine knew that the robber was armed and did
240. See WELSH S. WHITE & JAMES J. TOMKOVICZ, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE:
CONSTITUTIONAL CONSTRAINTS UPON INVESTIGATION AND PROOF 122-125 (Lexis Nexis
6th ed. 2008) (1994).
241. See generally Vale v. Louisiana, 399 U.S. 30, 30 (1970); Warden v. Hayden, 387
U.S. 294, 294 (1967).
242. See Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 294 (1967).




247. See Warden, 387 U.S. at 298.
248. See id.
249. See id. (quoting McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451, 456 (1948).
250. See id.
251. Id. at 298-99.
252. See Warden, 387 U.S. at 299.
2010] 169
PENN STATE INTERNATIONAL LAW REVIEW
not know that some weapons had been found by the time he searched the
machine.253 According to the Court, the officer was fully justified in
looking for weapons.2 54
Since Warden, the Court has limited this exception.255 In Welsh v.
Wisconsin,2 56 the defendant was driving erratically and began to swerve,
eventually driving off the road and onto an open field from which he
subsequently fled.257 Police soon arrived, and witnesses told police that
the defendant was either sick or inebriated.258 After checking the
vehicle's registration, police learned that the defendant lived within
walking distance of the abandoned car.259 Policed entered his house
without a warrant and arrested him for driving a motor vehicle while
under the influence of an intoxicant. 2 60 The Court held that the entry into
the defendant's home was unreasonable. 261
The Court stated that it only "recognized a few . . . emergency
conditions" that justify an exception to the warrant requirement.262 The
Court noted that homes have special Fourth Amendment protection and
that the defendant's crime was "minor." 2 6 3  The government asserted
three different exigencies that justified warrantless entry of a suspect's
home and subsequent arrest of the suspect:264 (1) officers were in "hot
pursuit";265 (2) officers needed to prevent the threat the defendant posed
to public safety;266 and (3) officers needed to preserve evidence of his
blood-alcohol level.267 The Court ruled that, given the particular facts of
the case, none of the proffered exigency exceptions justified the
warrantless search of the suspect's home. 2 6 8 The Court stated that "hot
pursuit" was a successful exigency only when there was an immediate
and continuous pursuit of the suspect at the scene of the crime. 26 9 The
Court also stated that a suspect must pose a remaining threat to the public
(in Welsh, the Court held that the moment the defendant left his vehicle,
253. See id. at 299-300.
254. See id. at 300.
255. See generally Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740, 740 (1984).
256. See id.
257. See id. at 742.
258. See id.
259. See id.
260. See Welsh, 466 U.S. at 743.
261. See id. at 754-55.
262. See id. at 749-50.
263. See id.
264. See id. at 753-54.
265. See Welsh, 466 U.S. at 753.
266. See id. at 754.
267. See id.
268. See id. at 753-54. Notably, the Court did leave open the possibility that these
three exigencies could justify a warrantless search in other factual circumstances.
269. See id. at 753.
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the threat was removed). 2 70 Lastly, the Court added that the need to
preserve dissipating evidence was valid, but it was not sufficient to
justify a warrantless search in the particular circumstances of the case.2 71
Welsh clarified the exigency exception to the warrant requirement
by establishing the following: (1) one's home has special Fourth
Amendment protections; 272 (2) the gravity of the crime is an important
factor in determining if any exigency exists; 2 73 and (3) "hot pursuit", the
prevention of threats posed to the public safety and the preservation of
dissipating evidence can be considered exigent circumstances depending
on the facts of a case.2 74
The plain-view doctrine is another exception to the warrant
requirement.275 The plain-view doctrine applies to situations where an
object is (1) in plain view, (2) of incriminating character (giving rise to
probable cause); (3) in a place where an officer is lawfully allowed to be
when the object is seen; and (4) in a place where an officer has a lawful
right to grab or access the item.2 76 The plain-view doctrine only applies
277
to seizures.
b. Exception to the Probable Cause Requirement: Terry Doctrine
The Terry doctrine2 78 creates an exception to the probable-cause
requirement such that probable cause is not needed for the government to
search an individual.279 Instead, the Terry doctrine sets a lower standard
to permit intrusion and involves a different type of test.2 80 The Terry
270. See Welsh, 466 U.S. at 753.
271. See id. at 754.
272. See id. at 750.
273. See id. at 753.
274. See id. at 753-54.
275. See WELSH S. WHITE & JAMES J. TOMKOVICZ, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE:
CONSTITUTIONAL CONSTRAINTS UPON INVESTIGATION AND PROOF 49 (Lexis Nexis 6th ed.
2008) (1994).
276. See Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128, 129 (1990).
277. See id. at 134 (1990) (stating that the idea of the plain-view doctrine being
considered an exception to the general rule of warrantless searches overlooks important
differences between search and seizures:
If an article is in plain view, neither its observation nor its seizure would
involve any invasion of privacy. A seizure of the article, however, would
obviously invade the owner's possessory interests. If "plain view" justifies an
exception from an otherwise applicable warrant requirement, therefore, it must
be an exception that is addressed to the concerns that are implicated by seizures
rather than by searches.).
278. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 1 (1968).
279. See id. at 30.
280. See id. at 20.
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doctrine involves a balancing test instead of the typical totality-of-the-
circumstances approach advanced in Brinegar.2 8 1  Under the Terry
doctrine, it is unnecessary to have a warrant based on probable cause. 28 2
The Terry doctrine originated from the Supreme Court ruling in Terry v.
Ohio.283
In Terry, an undercover police officer observed two defendants
engage in suspicious activity.284 The policeman testified that he saw both
suspects pacing back and forth in front of a store window and that he
believed they were preparing to rob the store. 285 The officer approached
both men and began to question them.286 Shortly thereafter, one of the
defendants, Terry, "mumbled something," and the officer spun him
around and patted down the outside of his clothing.287 The officer felt a
pistol and ordered Terry to hand it over.288 The officer then patted down
the other suspect and found a gun on his person, as well. 289 The officer
never put his hands beneath the outer layer of clothing when he patted
down the defendants.29 0
The issue before the Supreme Court was whether Terry's "stop and
frisk" was an unreasonable search and seizure in violation of the Fourth
Amendment. 2 9 1 The Court held that stops and frisks do not violate the
Fourth Amendment per se.292 In drawing this conclusion, the Court first
held that a stop and frisk is equivalent to a search and seizure and,
therefore, falls within the Fourth Amendment.293 Next, the Court held
that a stop and frisk is a particular type of police conduct that must be
done swiftly and, therefore, is not subject to the traditional warrant
procedure.294 Instead, the Court decided that a stop and frisk is subject to
the "Fourth Amendment's general proscription against unreasonable
searches and seizures."295 In other words, the Court interpreted the
actual words of the Fourth Amendment as having two distinct parts, A &
B. 2 9 6 Part A ends at "shall not be violated" and requires that the search
281. See Brinegar, 338 U.S. at 163.
282. See Terry, 392 U.S. at 20.
283. See id.
284. See id. at 6.
285. See id.
286. See Terry, 392 U.S. at 6-7.




291. See Terry, 392 U.S. at 9.
292. See id. at 31.
293. See id. at 16-17.
294. See id. at 20.
295. See id.
296. See Terry, 392 U.S. at 20.
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and seizure not be unreasonable.2 97 Part A does not, based on the plain
meaning of the Fourth Amendment, require probable cause or a
298
warrant. Instead, Part B requires that a warrant be issued based on
probable cause.299 So dividing the Fourth Amendment allowed the Terry
doctrine to exist alongside the warrant and probable-cause
requirements .300 Next, the Court held that the proper test for a stop and
frisk is a balancing test of the government interest in conducting the
search and seizure on one hand and the invasion that the search or
seizure entails on the other.30 1  The Terry Court held that the
government's interest could be crime prevention and detection, and that
searches and seizures should be limited to whatever the justification for
the search is. 30 2  In Terry, the justification was to protect the police
officer from gunfire and other means of assault. 303 The Court rejected
the government's additional argument for destruction of evidence, stating
that it was an invalid justification for both the stop and frisk and the
protection of the police officer.304
Terry left open such questions as what burden of proof the
government must carry, what precisely counts as a government interest,
and what degree of protection against intrusion is afforded to citizens.30 s
The level of proof needed under the Terry doctrine is reasonable
suspicion instead of probable cause.306 In Alabama v. White, the Court
defined reasonable suspicion307 as a lower standard than probable cause
that is satisfied by a lower quantity and quality of information. 3 0s The
Court's standard requires that an officer "be able to articulate something
more than an 'inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or hunch."'
3 0 9
Further, the Court stated that "the Fourth Amendment requires 'some
minimal level of objective justification' for making the stop."310
Through a series of cases, the Court has slowly defined what is
meant by "government interest." " In Terry, the crime was conspiracy
297. See U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
298. See id.
299. See id.
300. See Terry, 392 U.S. at 20-21.
301. See id. at 20-21.
302. See id at 22.
303. See id. at 29.
304. See id. at 29.
305. See Terry, 392 U.S. at 29.
306. See Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 325 (1990).
307. See id.
308. See id. at 330.
309. See White, 496 U.S. at 329-30 (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 27 (1968)).
310. See id. at 330 (1990) (quoting INS v. Delgado, 466 U.S. 210, 217 (1984)).
311. See Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 119 (2000); White, 496 U.S. at 325;
Florida v. J.L., 529 U.S. 266, 266 (2000).
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to commit armed robbery, and the Court determined that an officer's
reasonable fear of life and limb was a government interest sufficient to
justify the stop and frisk.3 12 In Illinois v. Wardlow, the defendant was
carrying an opaque bag, waiting on a street corner in a neighborhood that
had a reputation for individuals carrying weapons.3 13 The Wardlow
Court held that the "high crime area" was a factor in the Terry analysis
and held that the officers were in danger when they initiated the stop and
frisk.314 In Alabama v. White, the defendant committed a possessory
offense of carrying marijuana, and, therefore, produced no fear of
violence. 315 Nevertheless, the Court in White held that the officers had
reasonable suspicion based on a tip and that sufficient government
interest existed.316 Based on these three cases alone, the Court has
created a spectrum that ranges from a violent crime in progress (Terry v.
Ohio) to a possessory offense with no fear of violence (Alabama v.
White).31 Essentially, there is a government interest whenever a crime is
being committed.
On the other side of the balancing test is the degree of government
intrusion. Several United States Supreme Court cases have scrutinized
particular instances of government intrusion.318 However, the Court will
look at certain factors, such as whether a person was forcibly removed
from his or her home or other place in which he or she was entitled to be
and transported to a police station,31 whether the touching was
exploratory and/or grabbing, 3 20 and whether the duration of the stop and
frisk was reasonable.321
312. See Terry, 392 U.S. at 19.
313. See Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 119 (2000).
314. See id. at 124.
315. See White, 496 U.S. at 327.
316. See id. at 332.
317. See Terry, 392 U.S. at 19; White, 496 U.S. at 327.
318. See Hayes v. Florida, 470 U.S. 811, 811 (1985); Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508
U.S. 366, 378 (1993); United States v. Sharpe, 407 U.S. 675, 685 (1985).
319. See Hayes v. Florida, 470 U.S. 811, 816 (1985) (holding that transportation of
the suspect is deemed illegal if there is no probable cause and warrant).
320. See Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366, 378 (1993) (holding that it is illegal
to continue exploration after the officer has confirmed and dispelled the threat he or she
feared).
321. See United States v. Sharpe, 407 U.S. 675, 685 (1985) (holding that the longer





Differences between United States and Hong Kong laws regarding
searches do not end at the plain meaning of the relevant texts or
interpretations of intent. Rather, the ways in which the rules themselves
are applied are dramatically different. The plain-meaning differences
coupled with Hong Kong's continued reliance on United Kingdom case
law are at the root of the issue.
2. Looking Outside Borders: Hong Kong Case Law
In the 2006 case of HKSAR v. Chan Kau Tai ("Chan Kau Tai"),3 22
the Court of Appeal of the High Court in Hong Kong handed down a
decision that shows one of the most important distinctions of the Hong
Kong legal system. In its sixty-page opinion, the Chan Kau Tai Court
detailed Hong Kong case law that pertains to the right of privacy, and
that also pertains to government searches and seizures. 323 In Chan Kau
Tai,3 24 the Court created a test dealing with the admissibility of evidence
obtained via the breach of one's constitutional rights.325 Particularly, the
Court dealt with the violation of the right of privacy against government
searches in the workplace. 326 The defendant in Chan Kau Tai was a
public servant who was suspected of taking bribes. 327 The Independent
Commission Against Corruption ("ICAC") investigated the matter
further by obtaining consent from the Director of Housing, who was the
defendant's superior, to place covert surveillance devices throughout the
office.328 Cameras were installed to observe the defendant's conduct and
to listen to the defendant's end of telephone conversations.329 However,
no listening devices were actually placed in the defendant's telephone.330
The ICAC eventually observed the defendant counting bank notes in the
office on several occasions.33  The evidence was used against the
defendant at his trial,332 and he was convicted on sixteen counts of
322. See HKSAR v. Chan Kau Tai, [2006] 1 H.K.L.R.D. 400, 400 (C.A.).
323. See id.
324. See id.
325. See id. at 403.
326. See id.
327. See Chan Kau Tai, [2006] 1 H.K.L.R.D. at 401.
328. See id. at 435.
329. See id. at 436.
330. See id. at 436.
331. See id.
332. See Chan Kau Tai, [2006] 1 H.K.L.R.D. at 436.
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bribery. The defendant challenged the evidence on appeal because the
method used to acquire it infringed his right of privacy.33 4 The Court
was faced with this question: when "a constitutional right is infringed,
what is the status of any evidence that has been obtained in consequence
of this breach?"33 5
The Court began its analysis by citing the definition of "privacy" in
the Shorter Oxford English Dictionary.3 Dissatisfied with this
definition, the Court proceeded to discuss Article 30 of the Basic Law,337
which grants Hong Kong residents the right of privacy for
communications but only protects visual communication. 338 The Court
also cited the common-law rule, adopted by the United Kingdom and
Canada, that a right of privacy exists where one has a reasonable
expectation of privacy. 339 The Court stated that the nature of the place is
a factor in determining whether a reasonable expectation of privacy
exists. 34 0 Using United Kingdom cases, the Court held that a person is
entitled to a right of privacy in his or her workplace in certain
circumstances. 34 1  The Court rejected the government's position that
there was consent by the defendant's superior and that the defendant was
a public servant.342 Instead, the Court noted that the only situation where
there is no right to privacy in the workplace is where employers clearly
notify the employees that monitoring of the office will occur.343 The
Court's reasoning is compatible with the type of reasoning seen in the
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence in the United States because
knowledge of surveillance would diminish the reasonable expectation of
privacy for the defendant.344 Again, the Court of Appeal of the High
Court cited cases from the United Kingdom to support its recognition of
workplace privacy and the notification exception to that category of
privacy.3 45
333. See id. at 401.
334. See id. at 402.
335. See id. at 436.
336. "The state or condition of being withdrawn from the society of others or from
public attention; freedom from disturbance or intrusion; seclusion." See SHORTER
OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (5th ed. 2002).
337. See Chan Kau Tai, [2006] 1 H.K.L.R.D. at 436.
338. For the actual words of Article 30, see supra note 131 and accompanying text.
339. See Chan Kau Tai, [2006] 1 H.K.L.R.D. at 437.




344. See U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
345. For the "nature of place" factor and the exception to workplace privacy, the
Hong Kong Court cited to Halford v. United Kingdom, (1997) 24 E.H.H.R. 523.
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The Court-using the right of privacy, the reasonable-expectation
test, and United Kingdom case law creating a workplace-privacy
doctrine-held that the defendant's constitutional right of privacy in the
workplace was breached because he did not receive notice that his office
was being monitored.34 6 However, the Court then asked whether "the
evidence obtained by the covert surveillance in breach of the applicant's
constitutional rights [was] rendered inadmissible[.]" 34 7
Before answering this question, the Court expounded on the United
Kingdom's answer to the question.34 8 In particular, the Court cited
United Kingdom cases that preceded the Joint Declaration between the
United Kingdom and Hong Kong, such as R v. Sang & Another3 49 and R
v. Cheung Ka Fai & Another.350 The Court quoted R v. Cheung for the
proposition that the "test of admissibility of evidence is relevance."
The Court also quoted Lord Diplock in R v. Sang, where he wrote that
"to exclude evidence obtained 'unfairly or by trickery' involves a claim
to judicial discretion. . . . [A] court has no such power." 352 Furthermore,
the Court cited Lord Diplock again in R v. Sang for the proposition that
"[t]he court is not concerned with how [the evidence] was obtained."
Despite acknowledging the factual differences between R v. Sang &
Another and R v. Cheung Ka Fai & Another,3 54 the Court adhered to the
above principles created by the United Kingdom.35 5 The Court also cited
United Kingdom case-law that observed "the existence of discretion to
exclude as well as admit" evidence.356 But the Court did not simply
adopt United Kingdom holdings and end the analysis. Instead, the Court
integrated the Basic Law357 with United Kingdom common law358 to
produce the following hybrid test:
346. See Chan Kau Tai, [20061 1 H.K.L.R.D. at 439.
347. See id.
348. See id.
349. See R v. Sang & Another, [1980] A.C. 402 (A.C.).
350. See R v. Cheung.Ka.Fai. & Another, [1995] 3 H.K.C. 214, 214 (C.A.).
351. See id. at 222.
352. See R v. Sang & Another, [1980] A.C. 402, 422.
353. See id. at 437.
354. The Hong Kong court mentions how in R v. Sang & Another, the UK court did
not have to deal with any constitutional or European convention provisions or statutory
provisions. See Chan Kau Tai, [2006] 1 H.K.L.R.D. at 441.
355. Although the Court in Chan Kau Tai stated common-law principles that
originated in the United Kingdom, the Court failed to cite exactly how such principles
were created. See id.
356. See id.
357. The Basic Law was not the governing law in Hong Kong when the United
Kingdom cases dealing with discretion were handed down. The United Kingdom cases
were litigated in 1980 and 1995. Hong Kong did not implement the Basic Law until
recently. See supra notes 40-160 and accompanying notes.
358. See Chan Kau Tai, [2006] 1 H.K.L.R.D. at 443.
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First, account must of course be taken by the court of any breaches of
rights contained in the Basic Law.... Second, any breach. .. will
not, however, automatically result in the exclusion of the evidence
obtained in the consequence of the breach: the court still retains
discretion to admit or exclude the evidence. Third, the discretion ...
involves a balancing exercise in which the breach of constitutional
rights is an important factor whose weight will depend on mainly two
matters: the nature of the right involved and the extent of the
breach. 359
This test recognizes the rights provided by the Basic Law yet also
contains the discretionary rule followed in the United Kingdom.360
Next, the Hong Kong court delved into greater detail with each of
the three prongs of the test. 36 1 In the first prong, the Court noted that it
would look at "both facets" of the "public interest" to determine whether
there had been a breach of the Basic Law.362 The facets of public interest
are: [1] the interest in protecting and enforcing constitutionally
guaranteed rights versus [2] the interest in the detection of crime and
bringing criminals to justice.363 The Court noted that the "latter facet of
public interest receives prominence" and cited Article 30's language to
bolster that proposition.3 64
The second prong, no automatic exclusion, has no specific test but
is a product of United Kingdom case law.365 As mentioned above,
United Kingdom cases hold that a judge has discretion over the
admissibility of evidence even after the breach of a constitutional
right.366
The third prong, the balancing test for discretion, entails a balancing
of the right that has been breached and the extent of the breach.3 67 The
Chan Kau Tai wrote that "some rights [are] more fundamental and
important than others"36 8 and used examples to illustrate this principle.369
359. See id.
360. See id. at 441.
361. See id. at 443.
362. See id. 445.
363. See Chan Kau Tai, [2006] 1 H.K.L.R.D. at 445.
364. See id.
365. As mentioned earlier, the lack of an automatic exclusion is the byproduct of R v.
Sang & Another. See supra notes 343-354 and accompanying text.
366. See R v. Sang & Another, [1980] A.C. 402 (A.C.); Halford v. United Kingdom,
(1997) 24 E.H.H.R. 523.
367. See Chan Kau Tai, [2006] 1 H.K.L.R.D. at 447.
368. Id.
369. The Hong Kong Court gives the example of
a breach of a defendant's constitutional right to a fair trial must inevitably
result in conviction being quashed. By contrast the constitutional provision
requiring a suspect to be informed of his right to consult a lawyer, although of
great importance, is a somewhat lesser right and potential breaches can vary
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For the extent of the breach, Hong Kong courts will look at the probative
value of the evidence and at how crucial the evidence was.3 70 Also,
courts will look at the interests of effective prosecution (i.e., no delay or
interference with the prosecution's case), punishment of crime, and
detection of crime by investigating authorities. 371  The Chan Kau Tai
Court adopted this balancing test from a New Zealand case, R v.
Shaheed.3 72
As a result, the Chan Kau Tai Court held that the defendant's right
of privacy was infringed by the covert surveillance but that the lower-
court judge did not err in admitting the evidence based on the balancing
test of the third prong.373 The Court did not directly apply the new test to
the facts presented but simply stated that the lower court did not err.374
Regardless of the depth of the Court's analysis, there is one
important aspect to note. Chan Kau Tai represents the tensions, or
possible alleviation of past tensions, between the old and new legal
system of Hong Kong. The old system would have cited only to United
Kingdom common law.375 But the Chan Kau Tai Court decided to cite
the Basic Law as well.376 In a deeper sense, the Court tried to break free
of its colonial roots by following the Basic Law, which was created by
the PRC. Although there was no in-depth explanation of why the Court
decided to merge the common law and the Basic Law,377 Chan Kau Tai
shows that Hong Kong may be headed in a new direction.378 The hybrid
test that the Court created reflects the "One Country, Two Systems"
policy by respecting the PRC via implementation of the Basic Law,
while simultaneously respecting its own autonomy by following United
Kingdom case law as it did before the Joint Declaration.379
Overall, the Chan Kau Tai Court's analysis of "reasonable
expectation of privacy" coupled with how it determined admissibility of
evidence are important and relevant to the comparative analysis of the
greatly in gravity. In such a case not every breach will result in a confession
being excluded.
HKSAR v. Chan Kau Tai, [2006] 1 H.K.L.R.D. 400, 447 (C.A.).
370. See Chan Kau Tai, [2006] 1 H.K.L.R.D. at 449 (quoting R v. Shaheed, [2001] 2
N.Z.L.R. 377, 380 (C.A.)).
371. See id. at 450.
372. See R v. Shaheed, [2001] 2 N.Z.L.R. 377, 377 (C.A.).
373. See Chan Kau Tai, [2006] 1 H.K.L.R.D. at 451.
374. See id. at 449.
375. See Sang Woo Lee, Note, An Obligation to Act: When the U.S. Voices Concern
About China's Criminal Justice System, 20 TEMP. INT'L & COMP. L.J. 591, 591 (2006).
376. See Michael Yahuda, Deng Xiaoping: The Statesman, THE CHINA QUARTERLY,
Sep. 1993, at 551-572.
377. See Chan Kau Tai, [2006] 1 H.K.L.R.D. at 440.
378. See id. at 445.
379. See id. at 449.
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Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution. The Fourth
Amendment search provision involves an analysis of one's reasonable
expectation of privacy,380 and the amendment as a whole and as
enshrining a constitutional criminal-procedure right, determines whether
evidence is admissible.381
IV. THE FORCES THAT DRIVE THE DIFFERENCES IN SUBSTANTIVE LAW
Based on the cases discussed above, the major differences between
the United States and Hong Kong search-and-seizure case law can be
placed into four categories: [1] the meaning of reasonable expectation of
privacy under each system; [2] the method each system uses to determine
the admissibility of evidence; [3] the sources to which both systems
derive their standards and tests; and [4] the viewpoints each system has
regarding constitutional rights.
A. Reasonable Expectation ofPrivacy
Hong Kong courts seem to focus on the relevance of evidence rather
than the reasonable expectation of privacy.3 82 Chan Kau Tai explicitly
states that it is "not necessary" to embark on a privacy analysis; instead,
the Court discusses the admissibility of evidence in general based on the
test it formulated.38 3 In fact, the opinion quickly concludes that the
defendant's right of privacy was breached because he was unlawfully
searched without consent.384 The analysis only discusses one factor, the
nature of the place where the defendant was when he was searched, and
the Chan Kau Tai Court quickly cites United Kingdom cases without
giving a more robust explanation.38 5 Unlike United States courts, Hong
Kong courts seem to avoid an objective/subjective-expectation-of-
privacy test to determine if a defendant has been searched. 386 Instead, the
Chan Kau Tai Court states that the workplace has a presumption of
privacy absent certain circumstances, such as when employees are
notified that they are being monitored. *
380. See Katz, 389 U.S. at 347.
381. Any violation of the Fourth Amendment results in the evidence being "tainted"
and inadmissible or suppressed at trial. This is known as the Fruit of the Poisonous Tree
doctrine. See Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 383 (1914).
382. See Chan Kau Tai, [2006] 1 H.K.L.R.D. at 444 (noting that the role of the court
is not to determine whether unlawfully obtained evidence may be admissible).
383. See id. 439-440.
384. See id. at 450.
385. See id. at 438.
386. See HKSAR v. Chan Kau Tai, [2006] 1 H.K.L.R.D. 400, 438-39 (C.A.); cf Katz
v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 347 (1967).
387. See Chan Kau Tai, [2006] 1 H.K.L.R.D. at 438-39.
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In the United States, courts determine whether the Fourth
Amendment has been infringed mainly by means of focusing on
reasonable expectations of privacy and other tests and factors.3 8 8 The
different focus of each analysis may be due to the fact that in Hong
Kong, evidence may be admissible despite a breach of constitutional
rights.389 If a Hong Kong judge may exercise discretion even after a
constitutional breach, then what is the point of detailing whether a breach
occurred? From a judicial-efficiency standpoint, much time and money
might be saved were focus placed on the "back end" of the analysis (the
test for discretion to admit or exclude evidence) rather than on the "front
end" of the analysis to determine if a defendant's reasonable expectation
of privacy had been breached. Conversely, it would make more sense for
United States courts to spend a majority of their time determining
whether there was a search, regardless of its reasonableness, because the
moment evidence fails the objective/subjective-expectation-of-privacy-
tests or does not meet the exceptions for probable cause and a warrant, it
is tainted, and it is inadmissible or suppressed via the fruit-of-the-
poisonous tree doctrine.390
B. Admissibility ofEvidence
United States and Hong Kong courts treat the infringement of a
constitutional right in alarmingly different ways. In the United States,
evidence obtained when a constitutional right is infringed is tainted and
is subject to suppression or deemed inadmissible pre-trial. 39 1 In Hong
Kong, there is no automatic exclusion.392 As mentioned above, Hong
Kong judges resort to a discretionary test to determine if such evidence
should be admitted or excluded.3 93 The test is protracted and takes into
account several public interests.3 94
There is a diminished value in the Basic Law of Hong Kong. Based
on Chan Kau Tai, constitutional breaches seem to be a rather minor
issue. Examples given by the Chan Kau Tai Court3 95 show that an
individual can have his or her constitutional rights violated and yet
subsequently be convicted based on evidence that was acquired
388. See supra notes 162-183 and accompanying text.
389. See Chan Kau Tai, [2006] 1 H.K.L.R.D. at 438-39.
390. See Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 383 (1914).
391. Looking at any Fourth Amendment case, the end result is either suppression or
admission of evidence. See, e.g., Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 383 (1914).
392. See Chan Kau Tai, [2006] 1 H.K.L.R.D. at 439.
393. See id. at 443.
394. See id. at 445-49.
395. See id.
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improperly.3 96 If the Basic Law cannot protect an individual in Hong
Kong, what will?
C. The Legal Foundation ofEach System's Principles
The sources that United States and Hong Kong courts cite are
important to note for the purpose of predicting future case outcomes. In
the United States, Fourth Amendment case analysis consists of citing
contemporary sources (i.e., recent precedent) combined with taking an
originalist approach.39 7 In Hong Kong, however, courts will look to the
case law of other countries. In Chan Kau Tai, the Court looked to the
United Kingdom, Canada and New Zealand.399 Several reasons explain
this difference in how the two systems treat case law.40 0 For the United
States, historically, the idea was to rebel from the ways of Great Britain
and to reject how Great Britain regarded searches and seizures. 4 0 1 For
Hong Kong, the Basic Law is relatively new and requires courts to
continue to interpret the Basic Law with common-law principles derived
from the United Kingdom. In Chan Kau Tai, the Court looked to cases
handed down before the implementation of the Basic Law.4 02 These
sources for the principles of citation are at the heart of some of the major
substantive differences in both countries' analyses of privacy and the
admissibility of evidence.
D. Constitutional Viewpoint
In the United States, an individual's constitutional rights are
significant, and every constitutional right is treated seriously.403 In Hong
Kong, as demonstrated in Chan Kau Tai, courts place less significance
on constitutional rights.404 The Chan Kau Tai Court notes that in
determining the third prong of its admissibility test (viz., the discretion to
admit or exclude evidence), the nature of the right is important.4 05 In
particular, the Court states that some rights are more important than
others and that breaches of more important rights result in a greater
396. See id. at 447.
397. See Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 27 (2001).
398. See Chan Kau Tai, [2006] 1 H.K.L.R.D. at 439.
399. See id.
400. See id.
401. See supra notes 106-183 and accompanying text.
402. See Chan Kau Tai, [2006] 1 H.K.L.R.D. at 441.
403. See Marbury v. Madison, I Cranch 137 (1803).
404. See Chan Kau Tai, [2006] 1 H.K.L.R.D. at 441 (stating that breach of a
constitutional right is not a per se ground for the inadmissiblity of evidence).
405. See id. at 447.
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likelihood of evidence so obtained being excluded.4 06 Furthermore, the
Chan Kau Tai Court states that the breach of a constitutional right is only
one factor in its test.407 In the United States, a breach of a constitutional
right, a Fourth Amendment right in particular, results in the suppression
or inadmissibility of evidence.408 Moreover, in the United States, if a
constitutional right is breached or infringed, the individual is granted the
fullest extent of protection the federal Constitution has to offer.409
E. United States Rule Applied to Chan Kau Tai
United States courts might interpret the Chan Kau Tai facts as not
constituting an infringement of the defendant's right of privacy. The
United States uses a subjective/objective-expectation-of-privacy-test to
determine first whether a search has taken place. 41 0 The Chan Kau Tai
defendant appears to have a subjective expectation of privacy because he
may not have received notice that his workplace was being monitored,411
and he may not have realized that his company could use monitoring to
make records of his activity.412 Furthermore, the covert surveillance
device that was used is not generally used by the public.4 13 On the other
hand, the defendant's subjective belief that he has a right of privacy in
his workplace may be objectively unreasonable. A public servant who
counts bank notes in the open when that servant lacks authority to deal in
bank notes enjoys a lowered expectation of privacy. Furthermore, the
inspections in Chan Kau Tai were mainly visual,4 14 and so long as the
defendant was in the open when he conducted allegedly illegal activities,
he should have known that even someone passing by could visually
415inspect his activities.
Assuming the Chan Kau Tai defendant had a reasonable expectation
of privacy, United States courts would most likely consider the search of
both his person and office to be unreasonable. First, the facts in Chan
Kau Tai are lacking on the issue of probable cause.4 16 The Chan Kau Tai
opinion only states that the government had reason to believe that the
406. See id.
407. See id. at 404.
408. See Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 383 (1914).
409. See generally Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 347 (1967); Smith v.
Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 736 (1979).
410. See Katz, 389 U.S. at 347.
411. See Smith, 442 U.S. at 736.
412. See id.
413. See id.
414. See Bond, 529 U.S. at 334.
415. See Smith, 442 U.S. at 735.
416. See Chan Kau Tai, [2006] 1 H.K.L.R.D. at 421.
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defendant was taking bribes.417 Assuming arguendo that probable cause
existed, there was no warrant or any attempt to secure a warrant to place
the covert surveillance devices in the defendant's office.4 18 Furthermore,
the Chan Kau Tai facts do not suggest exigent circumstances existed as
to allow the government to use covert devices.4 19 There are, however,
facts that support seizure under the plain-view exception. The videotape
showed the Chan Kau Tai defendant counting bank notes. 4 20 But the
plain-view exception fails to justify the seizure because the govemment
did not inadvertently happen upon the defendant counting the bank notes.
Instead, the government entered his office before he was observed
counting the bank notes and installed the covert device.421
Overall, a Fourth Amendment analysis applied to the facts of Chan
Kau Tai shows clear differences between the United States and Hong
Kong systems. The United States system is complex and is derived from
422
more than 200 years of case law. Hong Kong's Fourth Amendment
equivalent is simple and consists of one test and several sub-tests.4 23
Hong Kong's test allows for less analytical work by judges and
ultimately is reducible to judicial discretion.424
IV. CONCLUSION: DEMOCRATIC SKIN, COMMUNIST HEART
Despite appearing democratic, Hong Kong's Basic Law is
communist in application.425 The Basic Law gives Hong Kong citizens a
false sense of protection because it ultimately subjects the admissibility
of evidence simply to judicial discretion.426 The differences between the
Basic Law and the Fourth Amendment are present at every phase of the
analysis.427
First, there are fundamental differences in the origin of the two
systems' constitutional provisions which protect against government
searches.4 28 The Fourth Amendment has existed for more than 200 years
and is the product of rebellious change from the tyrannical rule of
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422. See supra notes 160-250 and accompanying text.
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424. See id.
425. See supra Parts III.B, IV.
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Furthermore, the PRC has a great deal of power over amending any
provision of the Basic Law; this diminishes the Basic Law's democratic
value.4 3 1 Differences in the actual text of the Fourth Amendment and
Hong Kong's equivalent have a profound effect on their application from
a plain-meaning approach.4 32
Second, there are differences in case law.433 The United States has a
complex Fourth Amendment analysis which has multiple tests with
multiple prongs that screen multiple factors.434 Hong Kong has one test
with several sub-parts and ultimately, in application, leaves the decision
of admissibility to judicial discretion.43 5
Third, courts in both systems view the law in fundamentally
different ways.436 United States and Hong Kong courts view the
reasonable expectation of privacy differently.4 37 Furthermore, both
systems have significantly different rules regarding the admissibility of
evidence after a constitutional breach has occurred.4 38 The United States
has an exclusionary rule that forbids the admission of evidence obtained
in violation of the Fourth Amendment. 4 39 Hong Kong leaves the judge to
exercise discretion after a citizen's constitutional rights have been
breached. 44 0  Additionally, United States courts look to domestic
precedent and the text of the Fourth Amendment to analyze evidentiary
issues, whereas Hong Kong courts look to foreign jurisdictions, primarily
the United Kingdom, for the applicable law.4 4 1 Finally, the United States
and Hong Kong accord their respective constitutions different levels of
deference.4 42 The United States views its Constitution as the supreme
law of the land.443 Hong Kong views the Basic Law as a legal code.444
In order for Hong Kong to truly remain autonomous, it must begin
to act as a true democracy. This Comment has shown, through a
comparative analysis, that a true democracy such as the United States
protects its citizens by strictly adhering to the rule of law. Furthermore,
if China truly wishes to improve its relationship with other nations and to
430. See supra Part II.B.l.
431. See supra Part II.B.L.
432. See supra notes 90-123 and accompanying text.
433. See supra Part III.
434. See supra Part III.A.
435. See supra Part III.B.
436. See supra Part IV.
437. See supra Part IV.A.
438. See supra Part IV.B.
439. See supra note 408 and accompanying text.
440. See supra note 365 and accompanying text.
441. See supra Part IV.C.
442. See supra Part IV.D.
443. See supra note 403 and accompanying text.
444. See supra note 373 and accompanying text.
2010] 185
186 PENN STATE INTERNATIONAL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 29:1
be a world leader, then it must adopt more democratic principles. China
must look to other democracies for examples of how to protect its
citizens. Only by protecting its citizens and thereby increasing the
morale of society in general will China maximize the respect it is due on
the world stage.
